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I. INTRODUCTION

In October 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
announced that it would propose a rule banning class action waivers in
arbitration agreements for consumer financial services products.1 This
proclamation came to fruition in May 2016 when the CFPB proposed 12
C.F.R. part 1040 and sought public comment on the proposed rule. 2 The
CFPB claims that the class-waiver, often imbedded in consumer arbitration
agreements, gives companies a "free pass from being held accountable by
their customers[,]" comparing it to the relief a consumer can obtain as being
part of a class action. 3 At the same time, the CFPB proposed reporting
requirements to the CFPB in the individual cases that proceed to
arbitration. 4 Tellingly, however, when the CFPB published its proposed
rule, it chose to exclude federal and state government financial entities from
the ban on class-waivers. 5 This panel on The CFPB, Consumer Contracts, and
Arbitration convened as part of the 11th Annual International Conference
on Contracts (K-CON XI) to discuss the CFPB's recent arbitration study,
and its arbitration proposal, as a foundation for discussing arbitration in the
1. Richard Cordray, CFPB Dir., Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at the
Arbitration Field Hearing (Oct. 7, 2015), (transcript available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-at-the-arbitration- fieldhearing-20151007 [hereinafter Cordray, Prepared Remarks].
2. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,925 (proposed May 24, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040) [hereinafter Arbitration Agreements]. The proposed rule provides:
A provider shall not seek to rely in any way on a pre-dispute arbitration agreement entered into
after the date set forth in § 1040.5(a) with respect to any aspect of a class action that is related to
any of the consumer financial products or services covered by 5 1040.3 including to seek a stay
or dismissal of particular claims or the entire action, unless and until the presiding court has ruled
that the case may not proceed as a class action and, if that ruling may be subject to appellate
review on an interlocutory basis, the time to seek such review has elapsed or the review has been
resolved.
Id.
3. Cordray, Prepared Remarks, supra note 1.
4. Id. See also Arbitration Agreements, supra note 2, at 32,891 (requiring pre-dispute arbitration
agreements to be reported to the CFPB if "entered into after the compliance date").
5. Id. at 32,925.
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greater world of consumer contracts. Peter Linzer, this year's lifetime
achievement award recipient, proposed and moderated the spirited panel
discussion. I was delighted to be joined by my two co-panelists, Jean
Sternlight and Richard Frankel, who are pioneers in the consumer rights
arena shaping arbitration policy. The CFPB's authority to regulate
arbitration in derogation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) comes from
the Dodd-Frank Act, which commissioned the CFPB to conduct a study of
arbitration in consumer financial services products and to propose
regulations based on that study.6 There will, no doubt, be a vociferous
challenge to the CFPB's authority to impose such a drastic regulation
limiting arbitration by imposing the class-action waiver ban.7 Indeed, as this
Essay was being prepared for publication, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia declared the CFPB's single-director
structure unconstitutional,subsequently vacated its decision, and granted the
CFPB's petition for a rehearing en banc.' The jurisdictional limit on the
CFPB's proposal, as compared to all consumer contracts, is that it only has

6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 5 1028,
124 Stat. 1376, 2003-04 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C 5 5518) (mandating the CFPB to conduct a study
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer financial products)
7. Id.The CFPB has authority to "prohibit or impose conditions or limitations" on pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in consumer financial products if the CFPB finds that the prohibition or
imposition of limitations is in "the public interest and for the protection of consumers." Id. § 5518(b).
But, the findings in any such rule "shall be consistent with the stud'. Id. (emphasis added). Any regulation
not apply to consumer contracts entered with consumer financial
implemented by the CFPB will
services providers before the expiration of 180 days after the effective date of the regulation.
Id.
5 5518(d).
8. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) vacated, rhrg
en bancgranted. The D.C. Circuit analyzed the enormous power this single director structure gave the
CFPB:
The CFPB's concentration of enormous executive power in a single, unaccountable, unchecked
Director not only departs from settled historical practice, but also poses a far greater risk of
arbitrary decision-making and abuse of power, and a far greater threat to individual liberty, than
does a multi-member independent agency.
...
This new agency, the CFPB, lacks that critical check and structural constitutional protection,
yet wields vast power over the U.S. economy. So "this wolf comes as a wolf."

Id. (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting)). The D.C. Circuit chose
to remedy the CFPB's structural flaw not by shutting down the CFPB, but electing the narrower
remedy of severing the "for-cause" director removal provision, making the CFPB Director removable
at the will of the President. Id The D.C. Circuit also held that the CFPB's actions against the plaintiff
violated bedrock principles of due process. Id.The ramifications of this decision certainly affect the
CFPB's unwieldy power, but the extent of that weakening remains to be seen as the case moves
forward.
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authority to regulate consumer financial services products.9 The rest of the
universe of consumer contracts, from products to other services, remains
unregulated except in piecemeal fashion.' ° As Richard Frankel offered in
his discussion, the CFPB's proposal to ban the class-action waiver sounds
the death knell for mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration according
to those in the consumer financial products industry.1 1
The class-action waiver is a well-known clause in consumer arbitration
agreements that simply states something like this excerpt drawn from
AT&T's mobile wireless services agreement:
The arbitrator may award declaratory or injunctive relief only in favor of the
individual party seeking relief and only to the extent necessary to provide relief
warranted by that party's individual claim. YOU AND AT&T AGREE
THAT EACH MAY BRING CLAIMS AGAINST THE OTHER ONLY IN
YOUR OR ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND NOT AS A PLAINTIFF
OR CLASS MEMBER IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS OR
12
REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDING.

The effect of the waiver is to (1) require binding individual arbitration,
which is often capped at a certain fee for the consumer and (2) to preclude
any consumer who is bound by the agreement (as they almost always are)
from proceeding as a class representative or member in a judicial class action
9. 12 U.S.C. 5 5518(c).
10. Congress has implemented a "Swiss-cheese" approach when it comes to consumer arbitration
agreements, prohibiting the agreement in some isolated instances. For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act precludes pre-dispute exclusive arbitration agreements in
residential-loan contracts. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(3) (2012). Other examples include 7 U.S.C. 5 26(n)(2)
(2012) (pre-dispute arbitration agreements not enforceable for commodity whistleblower claims);
10 U.S.C. 5 987(e)(3), (0(4) (2012) (rendering arbitration agreements unenforceable for military
members and families for payday loans and consumer-credit contracts, other than residential mortgages
and car loans); 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2012) (precluding automobile-dealer franchise pre-dispute
arbitration agreements); and 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(e) (2012) (precluding waiver of rights and remedies of
whisdeblower claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, including by pre-dispute arbitration agreement).
See also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REv. 161,199 n.92 (2015) (exhibiting
a variety of consumer and employment claims that remain unregulated).
11. Richard Frankel, 'What We Lose in Sales, We Make Up in Volume": The Faulvy Logic of the Financial
Services Industy's Response to the Consumer FinancialProtectionBureau's Proposed Rule Prohibiting Class Action
Bans in Arbitration Clauses., 48 St. Mary's L.J. 283, 286-87 (2016). See also U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Statement on CFPBFieldHearing on Arbitration,U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Oct. 7, 2015, 11:30 AM), https://
www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-statement-cfpb-field-hearing-arbitration ("If a CFPB
rule eliminates class action waivers, thus opening the litigation floodgates, then arbitration for most
consumers will likely disappear.").
12. AT&T Service Agreement, AT&T
6, https://www.attcom/equipment/legal/serviceagreement.jsp?qotermsKey=postpaidServiceAgreement&qtermsName=Service+Agreement
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2017).
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or class arbitration. The Supreme Court held that such class waivers are
enforceable in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,x 3 when it held that a
California judicial doctrine declaring class-waivers unconscionable was
preempted by the FAA. 14 It affirmed that rule in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant,1 5 when it held that the class-waiver did not deprive
individual litigants the prospective ability to vindicate low-value individual
claims. 1 6 Professor Frankel argues that business withdrawal from
arbitration upon prohibition of the class-action waiver shows that
arbitration has been a way to stifle the class action, but in my view this
debate has always centered on the question of individual arbitration versus
the efficacy of the class action. Indeed, CFPB Director Richard Cordray
touted the money garnered by class actions in his speech bolstering support
for the class-waiver ban, claiming that consumer financial services "group
lawsuits delivered, on average, about $220 million in payments to 6.8 million
consumers per year." 1 7 To put it bluntly, the public policy debate is about
individual binding arbitration versus the class action.
This Essay, which is based on my K-CON panel presentation and
comments made during the discussion period, makes three points: (1)
individual arbitration, rightly done, can be more advantageous for the
individual consumer than the class action; (2) the CFPB's ground-breaking
empirical study does not support the CFPB's drastic proposal to eliminate
the class waiver, and therefore, consumer arbitration; and (3) the CFPB, and
Congress, in later consumer action, should take a more cautious and
13. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
14. Id. at 346-47. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence under
the FAA, see Ramona L. Lampley, "Underdog"Arbitraio A Planfor Transpareny, 90 WASH. L. REV.
1727, 1736 (2015) (discussing the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence under the FAA). See
also Judith Resnick, Diffusing Disputer. The Pubfic in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the
ErasureofRigbts, 124 YALE L. J. 2804, 2862-77 (2015). The 2015 CFPB study on arbitration included
mobile wireless providers, based on the premise that consumers can charge expenses, such as ringtones,
through their phone bills. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

ACT § 1028(a), 5 2.3.6, at 25 (2015), [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO
CONGRESS]. The CFPB proposal extends to the mobile wireless industry, which is dominated by classarbitration waivers. But the nature of the classification of the mobile wireless industry as a consumer
financial service, itself, shows that the CFPB views its own authority as expansive. See Arbitration
Agreements, supra note 2, at 32,877 ("[A] wireless, wireline, or cable provider that allows consumers to
initiate payments to third parties through its billing platform would be covered by proposed
1040.3(a)(8).')
15. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
16. See Id. at 2312 (rejecting the "argument that class arbitration [i]s necessary to prosecute claims
'that might otherwise slip through the legal system."') (quoting AT&T Mobility Co. v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011)).
17. Cordray, Prepared Remarks, supra note 1.
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deliberate approach to incentivize fair and transparent consumer arbitration.
Because this Essay reflects our discussion during the K-CON XI panel, we
move through some complicated issues quickly. Nevertheless, some
background is necessary to provide a foundation for the policy proposed
herein. To that end this Essay will first discuss why consumer arbitration
could be beneficial to the consumer. Section II1 explains why the CFPB's
class-waiver ban will effectively kill this relatively new alternative dispute
forum for the consumer. Then, Section IV provides an overview of the
CFPB study, posits that the CFPB study does not support regulatory action
to promote the class device at the expense of removing the burgeoning
avenue of dispute resolution, and compares the current status of consumer
arbitration in the United States to evolving consumer dispute resolution in
the European Union. Finally, this Essay ends with a call to Congress and
federal agencies to regulate consumer arbitration in a way that promotes
transparency, consumer education, and further development of this
potentially promising arena for low-cost dispute resolution.
II.

MAKING THE CASE FOR CONSUMER ARBITRATION

Theoretically, consumer arbitration done right should worktheoretically, that is. Assume we have a hypothetical consumer claim for
$200 in excess fees against her credit card company. The consumer has a
range of choices: (1) call the credit card company and attempt to resolve the
dispute informally; (2) cancel her credit card; (3) file a civil dispute in court;
(4) proceed individually in arbitration; or (5) participate as a member of a
class action. Option 1 is the most attractive in that it involves little cost or
time on the part of either disputant. If resolved, the customer walks away
happy and the company gets to retain a loyal customer. But what if the
parties cannot resolve the dispute? Option 2 may be a market solution, but
does nothing to make the consumer whole for the alleged wrong. Two
hundred dollars is, a lot of money to most consumers, so we should assume
the consumer wants to pursue the claim, depending on cost and effort. The
consumer could file a civil action, whether it be in small claims court (as it
should be here), or in county court for larger claims. The downside to filing
even a small claims action is, of course, the typical barriers to entry-fees
and time. For a small claims court action in Bexar County, Texas (the
location of K-CON XI and St. Mary's University School of Law), the filing
fee is only $46.00, but then my consumer may have to pay for service of
process, which adds $75.00.18 Already my hypothetical plaintiff has nearly
18. 2016 Fikng Fees, BEXAR CTY. JUSTICES

OF THE PEACE http://home.bexar.org/
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eroded her likely recovery simply by fees. If she has a case for more damages
that is also more complex, she could be facing a filing fee of at least $282.00
(Bexar County Court) plus the costs of service, discovery, and proving her
9
All this assumes she has
case through a hearing, motions, or even trial.
some familiarity with the court system so that she can navigate the rules of
procedure sufficient to file a complaint and effectuate service of process.
The filing fees, complex procedural rules, and trial expenses are all barriers
to the consumer seeking individual relief for this low-value, but not quite de
minimis claim.

20

Then comes the class action, which is a proposed solution for vindicating
the claims that are too small to pursue individually. But for my hypothetical
consumer, she is out real money and if her case is proven, she seeks the
remedy of the full $200 (or close to it). As a member of a class, her
likelihood of receiving near full damages is not good. Anecdotally, we can
all think of class action settlements awarding the consumer cents on the
2 1 Indeed, the Jimmy John's
dollar, or worse, a coupon for a new product.
class-action "pickle" settlement, awarding the customer a $1.40 voucher for
a side item (pickle, potato chips, or a cookie) after filling out settlement

request forms proves the point too well-many consumer class action
on.2 2
settlements are not worth the paper the settlement notice is printed
jp/filing- fees.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
19. Bexar Couny District Clerk Fee Schedule, BEXAR CTY. DIsT. CLERK http://home.bexar.org/
dc/costs.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
20. Thank you to Professor Keith Rowley, University of Nevada Law Vegas William F. Boyd
School of Law, for pointing out that under Rule 131 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the
prevailing party is entitled to an award of the costs. This may provide an incentive to pursue the
individual action for low-value claims. However, given the reality that most civil cases settle, I wonder
to what extent the cost-shifting is taken into account in settlement discussions.
21. Professor Brian Fitzpatrick and Robert Gilbert find a wide range of recovery rates, (average
compensation as a percentage of damages) ranging from 60o-69% in their study of fifteen "smallstakes" consumer class actions against large domestic banks. Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Robert C. Gilbert,
An EepiricalLookat Compensation in Consumer ClaesActions, 1 N.Y.U.J.L. & BuS. 767, 770 (2015). They
found the average payout ranged from $13 to $90, with a wide variation in compensation rates (realized
compensation) between 1%--70%. Id. There is limited empirical data regarding consumer class action
compensation to the individual class member. Linda Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them,
64 EMORY L.J. 399, 418-19 (2014). Even the study referenced above is limited to fifteen related class
action settlements. A related issue is the risk that class actions create an incentive for private
enforcement of somewhat frivolous daims or minor misconduct. Professor Richard Marcus discusses
these risks in his article Bending in the Breeze, American ClassAcions in the Tweno-FirstCentury, 65 DEPAUL
L. REV. 497, 525-29 (2016).
22. William Choslovsky, Sue Jimmy John's, Get a Free Pickle, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 30, 2014, 4:51 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-jimmy-johns-class-actionsettlement-perspec-100-20140930-story.html. According to the story, the named plaintiff received
$5,000 for her claim that Jimmy John's listed some sandwiches as containing alfalfa sprouts, when the
sandwiches had no sprouts, and the plaintiff-class attorneys received $370,000. Id. See also Joint
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If my hypothetical consumer is willing to wear the mantle of named plaintiff,
sign complaints, interrogatories, and possibly appear for a deposition, she
stands the chance of being made more than whole ($5,000 for
misrepresented alfalfa ingredients), but the ordinary consumer class member
will more often be afforded nominal or meaningless recovery in the form of
a coupon, an additional "side product," or a pittance recovery, and that only
after proving entitlement to relief through a "claims made" process.
Then take individual arbitration. Assume the arbitration agreement meets
the "gold standard" in that it takes the form of the agreement at issue in
Concqodon. In this consumer-friendly arbitration agreement, the consumer
waives the class device through a mandatory contract. True, there is little
meeting of the minds. The consumer, by continued use of the product,
agrees to the terms and conditions imposed by the provider. But, in the
gold-standard agreement, the business pays all costs of arbitration.2 3 Even
in an inferior arbitration agreement, if the arbitration is to proceed before
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) (which is the most widely
selected provider), consumer fees are capped at $200 for disputes under
$10,000.24 Additionally, as part of the AT&T type of agreement, the
consumer has an "incentive" to pursue the dispute. If the consumer wins
an amount greater than AT&T's last written settlement offer prior to
arbitrator selection, AT&T guarantees the consumer an award of at least
$10,000, expenses, costs (including expert witness fees), and double
attorneys' fees. 25 Thus, as the Supreme Court observed in enforcing the
Conception arbitration agreement:
The [d]istrict [c]ourt found this scheme sufficient to provide incentive for the
individual prosecution of meritorious claims that are not immediately settled,
and the Ninth Circuit admitted that aggrieved customers who filed claims
would be "essentially guarantee[d]" to be made whole. Indeed, the [d]istrict
[c]ourt concluded that the Concepcions were better off under their arbitration
agreement with AT&T than they would have been as participants in a class
action, which "could take months, if not years, and which may merely yield
an opportunity to submit a claim for recovery of a small percentage of a few
Stipulation of Class Action Settlement, Starks v. Jimmy John's LLC, No. BC501113 at 3 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 1, 2014) (settling and releasing all claims against Jimmy John's in the matter).
23. AT&T Serie Agreement, supra note 12, at 2.2(3). This Essay uses the AT&T agreement as it
presently exists. It is largely the same in principle as the agreement at issue in Conception, although the
incentive values have increased.
24. Costs of Arbitration, AM. ARB. ASS'N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/
UCM/ADRSTAGE2021425&revision=latestreleased (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
25. AT&T Service Agreement, supra note 12, at 2.2(4). The attorney's fee award supplements fee

shifting provisions under applicable law, but does not permit duplicative recovery. Id at 2.2(3).
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26

One might look at this incentivizing agreement and argue AT&T should
never have to pay the $10,000 incentive and double attorneys' fees, because
it should always settle to avoid the payout (for claims less than $10,000).
But that result is advantageous for the consumer because it puts the
incentive on AT&T to settle for a reasonable amount even for claims that
are not clearly meritorious, all before the arbitrator is selected, in a dispute
resolution mechanism that is free for the consumer. In theory, consumer
arbitration stands to offer a better opportunity for real remedy to the
individual consumer than the consumer would realize as a member of a
class. A consumer may rationally choose to waive very low-value claims one
would only pursue as a class member,2 7 to preserve a fee-free dispute
resolution module for individual claims that provide an opportunity to be
made whole.2 8 But this is not to say that individual arbitration works this
way, yet. Individual arbitration is still in a relatively early stage of evolving
towards a more consumer-friendly module, having gone through a series of
changes in the late 1990s and 2000s as more corporate entities began
imposing the arbitration-class waiver. As courts examined more and more
arbitration agreements, the agreements began to evolve to more consumer29 Many
friendly, business subsidized, incentivizing types of agreements.
consumer arbitration agreements now require any hearing to be held in the
26. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (first quoting Laster v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d, 849, 856 n.9 (9th Cir. 2009); then quoting and Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008)).
27. Director Cordray quoted Judge Richard Posner as having said, "[O]nly a lunatic or a fanatic
sues for $30." Cordray, Prepared Remarks, supra note 1.
28. See Ramona L. Lampley, IsArbirationUnderAttack?:Exploring the Recent JudicialSkeptiism of the
Class Ar itration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 477, 512-18 (2009) (arguing that the consumer is actually better off in alternative dispute
resolution in a corporation-pays-all type agreement with a premium for winning, such as the one at
issue in Concepcion).
29. See Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1293 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding a forum
selection clause requiring the California plaintiff to arbitrate in Boston unconscionable); see also Ting v.
AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding a confidentiality provision
unconscionable), rev'd on othergrounds, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); McDonald v. Cash N Advance (In
reLucas), 312 B.R. 407, 411-12 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2004) (holding a unilateral right to select an arbitrator
substantively unconscionable); Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal Rptr. 3d 267,277 (Cal. Ct.App. 2003)
(holding a requirement for upfront consumer arbitration fees unconscionable); Swain v. Auto Servs.,
Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 108-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing an arbitration clause including a forum
selection clause requiring arbitration in another state and precluding attorney's fees); Bellsouth Mobility
LLC v. Christopher, 819 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 2002) (holding a limitation of liability to
actual damages substantively unconscionable); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (discussing the limitation of liability to actual damages).
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consumer's home town, include a small claims court carve-out, and have no

confidentiality requirement. 30 But consumer-arbitration clauses are largely
unregulated by the government or the courts. Section 2 of the FAA permits
courts to render arbitration agreements unenforceable on state law
grounds, 31 but the Supreme Court's holding in Italian Colors did nothing to
signal to state and federal lower courts that fee or cost barriers to arbitration
are generally unconscionable. 3 2 Indeed, the business to business (American
Express to small business owner) arbitration agreement held enforceable by
the Court in Italian Colors lacked the business-pays-all and incentivizing
clauses that were essential to an implied assessment of fairness in
Concpion.3 3 Following Concpcion and Italian Colors, a fruitful field for
congressional and agency regulation should be fostering free and fair
arbitration for the consumer. Specifically, the CFPB (and Congress) could
have required consumer arbitration to be (1) fully business funded; (2) with
an incentive for meritorious claims proceeding to adjudication; (3) to award
attorneys' fees plus a premium for meritorious claims to incentivize
representation; (4) preclude confidentiality of consumer arbitration filings
or results; (5) to require a written statement of opinion; (6) require more
data-reporting so that detection of bias and wrongdoing becomes more
likely; and (7) enlarge appellate review to include instances of manifest
disregard for the law.3 4
The view that consumer arbitration may be an adequate substitute for
class litigation raises one question: How does the individual consumer fare
in arbitration? Indeed, that has been the focus of some consumer studies
and many employment arbitration studies, to the extent data is available.
Looking at consumer "win" rates to assess fairness is almost necessarily
doomed to be slanted against corporate entities. The most comprehensive
30. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORTTO CONGRESS, supra note 14, 5 2.5.2, at 33, 5 2.5.8,

at 51-52.
31. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (declaring arbitration agreements enforceable
"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract").
32. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013). In Itakan Cokrs, the
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision holding an arbitration
agreement between American Express and several small business owners unenforceable due to the
cost of litigating individual antitrust claims. Id. The Court instead held that even when a plaintiffs
cost of arbitration exceeds the potential recovery, courts cannot refuse to enforce contractual class
arbitration waivers. Id. at 2306.
33. Id. at 2312.
34. There are any number of measures Congress could take to permit consumer arbitration to
develop as a fair alternative dispute resolution module, while also alleviating the concerns that have
developed over time. Some of these solutions were apparent through the arbitration agreement held
as enforceable in Concep ion. I urge Congress to adopt others in "Underdog" Arbitraion: A Planfor
Tranpareny, supra note 14.
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consumer study done to date, the CFPB study on arbitration, found in
consumer arbitration cases that resulted in a merits decision, consumers
"won" something in 20.3% of cases involving affirmative consumer
The average and median awards were $5,400 and $2,700
claims. 3"
respectively, meaning when consumers did win, they won an average of .57
cents on the dollar per amount claimed. 3 6 In contrast, businesses fared
much better, winning 93% of company disputes and .98 cents for every
dollar claimed. 3 7 But 26% of those company "wins" were due to exparte
judgments against a consumer who never participated in the arbitration and
38
The Searle Civil Justice
for whom the business paid the arbitration fees.
similar results, with
found
Institute Report on Consumer Arbitration
consumers "winning" some relief in 53.3% of cases consumers brought (128
out of 240) and businesses winning some relief in 83.6% of cases (51 out of
61). .39

It is tempting to look at the difference in win rates and conclude that
arbitration is not fair for consumers. But that would be a false assumption.
One cannot make an assessment of arbitration by simply comparing
consumer win rates to business win rates. First, the sample size of
arbitration merit decisions is small: only 341 total cases for a two-year period
40
More importantly, the study shows
resulted in a decision on the merits.
that most arbitration disputes resolved in a manner consistent with
settlement.'" Second, differing incentives to assert claims can explain some

35. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14, § 5.2.2, at 13. Even
in this comprehensive report, the sample size of affirmative consumer claims resulting in a merits
decision was low, at 158 cases. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. 5 5 at 14.
38. Id. This imbedded data shows another problem with consumer arbitration that the CFPB
could have regulated-to what extent should a company be able to obtain a default-judgment
equivalent in arbitration by fronting the consumer fees? This practice resulted in a high number of
business "wins" accounting for 26%. Id.

39. SEARLE CIVIL JUST. INST.,
ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION:

CONSUMER ARBITRATION
PRELIMINARY

BEFORE THE AMERICAN

REPORT

67-68

(2009),

https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG-010205 [hereinafter SEARLE CIVILJUST. INST.,
PRELIMINARY REPORT]
40. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supranote 14, § 5.2.2, at 13.
41. Id § 5 at 11. As the authors of the study diligently explained:
The minority of disputes that reach an arbitrator decision on the merits are not a random subset
of disputes that are filed, because parties may make different settlement decisions for different
types of claims. Parties settle claims strategically. For example, if the parties settle all strong
consumer (or company) claims filed, that will affect the types of disputes on which arbitrators
rule. Consumers (or companies) may appear to do poorly-or to bring only weak claims-but
that may result from settlement decisions as well as (or more than) from the arbitration process
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of the difference in outcomes. If a business funds all or most of the dispute
resolution process, consumers are incentivized to bring claims of
questionable merit. Yet for the business which must pay all or most of the
upfront costs ($1,500 per consumer claim under AAA rules),4 2 the incentive
is to not bring (1) low-value claims or (2) claims of questionable merit. Still
further, about 26% of the business wins were due to dispute resolutions in
which the business paid the customer fees, but the customer did not
participate or contest the allegations. 4 3 Even if this data was available, the
usefulness of it is in comparing it to how individual consumer litigants fare
in lifigation, not how companies perform as compared to consumers. 4 4 And
again, even if we had that data, certain qualifications would have to be made:
(1)
Do consumers bring different types of cases to arbitration than to court,
particularly under incentivizing clauses or a business-pays-all clauses?; 4 5 (2)
Are businesses more likely to settle claims with merit in arbitration to avoid
an incentivizing penalty?; (3) How do procedural devices such as motions
to dismiss or motions for summary judgment which enable courts to weed
out non-meritorious claims affect litigation "win" rates as compared to
arbitration, which typically does not have those devices? Any analysis of
comparative data between arbitration and litigation win/loss rates would
need to try to control for these procedural differences.4 6 The CFPB noted
the deficiencies in cautioning against comparative use of win-rate data,
stating: "These various considerations warrant caution in drawing
conclusions as to how well consumers or companies fare in arbitration as
compared to litigation. The frequency analysis shows, in significant
respects, the disputes that are filed in arbitration differ from the disputes
that are filed in litigation." 4 7
Accounting for these selection biases and other reasons win rates may be
disparate, the data gleaned from such studies will continue to be useful in
making some conclusions regarding the fairness of consumer arbitration.
But that assessment is premature because consumers are not filing many
cases (yet),48 consumers and attorneys need more education about
itself.
Id

§ 5 at 5.
42. Costs ofArbitraion,supra note 24.

43. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, smpra note 14, § 5.2.2, at 14.
44. SEARLE CIVIELJUST. INST., PRELIMINARY REPORT, supranote 39.
45. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supranote 14, § 5.1, at 7.
46. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitraion?,6 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 549, 558 (2008)
(discussing flaws in assessing raw-win rates and comparative-win rates to assess fairness of arbitration).
47. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14, § 5.1, at 7.
48. Id.§ 5 at 19 (stating that consumers filed about 1,234 consumer financial services arbitration
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arbitration as an alternative forum, and analysts need more robust data sets
from providers other than the AAA. But, as more fully explained infra
Section III.B, there are some data that signal that consumer arbitration can
be a useful alternative to the class action for vindication of consumer claims.
III. WHY THE CFPB CLASS-ACTION WAIVER PROPOSAL
WILL EFFECTIVELY KILL CONSUMER ARBITRATION
FOR CONSUMER FINANCIAL PRODUCTS (AND IS PREMATURE).

When the CFPB announced its plans to ban the class-action waiver, the
consumer financial products industry responded that they would withdraw
from arbitration all together. 4 9 Professor Richard Frankel, my co-panelist,
argues that this is indicative of the consumer financial services industry's
interest in avoiding class actions through the use of pre-dispute arbitration
with class-action waivers. I agree. As stated at the beginning of this Essay,
the analysis of the fairness of arbitration must include a utilitarian
comparison of arbitration versus the class action. And it is no secret that
corporate America has found shelter from some abusive class-action tactics
by providing for subsidized dispute resolution for the consumer at the
individual level. Professor Frankel argues that if arbitration is a better
alternative, why not allow individuals to opt in to arbitration after a dispute
50 But this
has arisen, and still preserve the option for a class vehicle.
argument does not account for the cost-benefit analysis undertaken by
companies who choose to adopt an arbitration agreement for consumers.
disputes from 2010-2012, an average of 411 per year, which is very low for consumer filings); see also
id. § 5 at 11.
49. The Consumer Financial Services Group stated the effect of the CFPB's proposal:
Although the CFPB's proposal reflects an inclination not to outright prohibit the use of
arbitration, let's make it perfectly clear. By requiring companies to insert in their arbitration
provisions language excepting class actions from arbitration, the Bureau is in reality proposing an
outright ban. If this proposal becomes a final regulation, most companies will simply abandon
arbitration altogether.
Consumer Fin. Servs. Grp., CFPB to ConsumerFinandalServicesCompanies: Prepareto Wave Goodbye to Class
2015), http://www.ballardspahr.com/
Action Waivers, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Oct. 7,
2
alertspublications/legalalerts/ 015-10-07-cfpb-to-consumer-financial-services-companies-prepare-towave-goodbye.aspx; see also Consumer Bankers Ass'n, Comment Letter on CFPB's Proposed
Rulemaking on Arbitration (March 16, 2016), http://consumerbankers.com/cba-issues/commentletters/joint-trades-letter-record-hfsc-hearing-31616 (urging the Bureau to "[d]etermine if prohibiting
or restricting the availability of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions would effectively
eliminate arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution process for the majority of consumers").
50. Richard Frankel, Drexel Univ., Presentation at the International Conference on Contracts:
Will the CFPB's Class-Action Proposal Drive Companies Away from Binding Mandatory Arbitration?
(Feb. 27, 2016).
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By imposing individual arbitration, the company should undertake to fund
some part of the dispute resolution process or risk a finding that the
agreement is unconscionable due to high fees." a The leading arbitration
providers require businesses to pay most of the arbitration fees,5 2 and many
companies fully fund consumer arbitration in an effort to make it consumerfriendly.5 3 By effectively forcing a consumer with no bargaining power into
arbitration, the company undertakes to subsidize that alternative dispute
arena to provide the consumer with a reasonably accessible forum for
resolution. This increases costs to the company, but those costs are worth
it to avoid the financial stress of multiple class actions. The simple tradeoff is that the business pays for the arbitration-but if the threat of the class
device, with heavy attorneys' fees and litigation costs remain, it makes no
economic sense to fund a select few consumer claims after a dispute
4
arises.

5

More plainly, the specter of class arbitration is something companies
rightfully avoid.5 5 Justice Scalia remarked on this trade-off five years ago in
Concepcion, observing that if consumers remain free to resolve their disputes
in arbitration or in court, "there is little incentive for lawyers to arbitrate on
behalf of individuals when they may do so for a class and reap far higher
fees in the process. And faced with inevitable class arbitration, companies
would have less incentive to continue resolving potentially duplicative
claims on an individual basis."5 6 Class arbitration is unwieldy. Discovery
must be had on issues of numerosity, commonality of claims, typicality or
individuality of issues, and whether the class representatives fairly and

51. See Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding "the fee
allocation scheme alone would render an arbitration agreement unenforceable").
52. See Costs ofArtraion,supra note 24 (capping consumer fees at $200 for cases in which less
than $10,000 is at issue and requiring business to pay $1700 filing fee and $750 arbitrator fee for a desk
arbitration in which no hearing is held); see also JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitration Pursuant to PreDispute Clauses Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness (eff. July 15, 2009) (capping consumer
fees at $250).
53. See, e.g., AT&T Service Agreement, supra note 12, at 2.2(4); see also Neoj£,c Terms of Use,
NETFLIX § 15(e), https://www.netflix.com/TermsOfUse (last updated May 5, 2016) (noting that
Netflix will promptly reimburse consumers for filing fees after receiving notice).
54. See Am. Bankers Ass'n, et al., Comment Letter on the CFPB's Consumer Arbitration Study,
at 10 (uly 13, 2015), http://consumerbankers.com/sites/default/files/July/2013%202015 / 20Cons
umer%20Arbitration%20StudyO/o20Comment/s20Letter.pdf ("Conversely, if the Bureau were to overregulate arbitration agreements or prohibit the use of class action waivers in such agreements, as some
advocate, many companies would likely discontinue offering arbitration to customers.').
55. For a discussion of class action over-enforcement of public or societal interests, see Marcus, supra
note 21, at 525-29 (discussing class actions asserted for seemingly minor misconduct, such as Kellogg's
claim that Frosted Mini-Wheats improved children's cognitive function).
56. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 347 (2011).
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adequately represent the class.5" There are important procedural phases,
from threshold dispositive motions to class certification, and finally
summary judgment. The entire process is one created by and bounded by
the rules of procedure, with the guarantee of judicial appellate review.
Arbitration, with its ability to discard the formality of procedure, is not
suited for the class device.5 8 And it is worth noting that even though the
CFPB has concluded that class actions are a more appropriate vehicle for
dispute resolution for consumers versus private companies, it excluded
government entities from the class-waiver ban. 9 To put it simply, without
the class-action waiver, companies have no economic benefit to subsidize
dispute resolution for the consumer or to offer individual settlement terms.
This puts the conversation squarely to a debate between individual
arbitration versus advantages of the class to the individual consumer or the
societal whole. And this is why, based on the data obtained thus far, that
the CFPB's rule proposing a class-action waiver ban is both premature and
reaches too far beyond the realities supported by the CFPB study.6 °
IV.
IS

THE

CFPB

STUDY SHows THAT CONSUMER ARBITRATION

A PROMISING DEVELOPMENT FOR REAL INDIVIDUAL REMEDIES
IF CAUTIOUSLY REGULATED BY CONGRESS OR AGENCIES.

On October 7, 2016, in a field hearing in Denver, Colorado, CFPB
Director Cordray announced that the CFPB will propose a rule banning the
class action waiver and requiring more data-reporting in the cases that
proceed to individual arbitration. 61 As discussed in the preceding section,
this will effectively kill subsidized consumer arbitration. In support of this
proposal, Cordray described individual arbitration and the class action
waiver as a "free pass" secured by financial services providers to make sure
"customers cannot group together to seek relief for wrongdoing." 62
Cordray touted the class action recoveries delivering "on average, about
$220 million in payments to 6.8 million consumers per year in consumer

57. FED. R CIv. P. 23.
58. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348 ("Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating
additional and different procedures and involving higher stakes.").
59. Arbitration Agreements, supranote 2, at 32,925.
60. Recall that Congress gave the CFPB the authority to "prohibit or impose conditions or
limitations on the use of an agreement... for arbitration ... if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition
or imposition... is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers... [but the findings]
12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
shall be consistent with the study ....
61. Cordray, Prepared Remarks, supra note 1. The CFPB proposed the rule in May 2016.
Arbitration Agreements, spra note 2, at 32,891.
62. Cordray, Prepared Remarks, supranote 1.
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financial services cases." 6 3 By drawing this conclusion, Director Cordray
made the decision that class actions are preferable to individual arbitration.
The CFPB study does not support this conclusion.6 4

A. Setting theStage: The CFPB Report and PriorResearch.
The groundbreaking and thorough arbitration study conducted by the
CFPB provided useful insight into this burgeoning arena of consumer
arbitration. Up until this research, empirical studies of consumer arbitration
were limited and few in number.6 5 In 2009, the Searle Civil Justice Institute
(SCJI) published a report on consumer arbitration,6 6 which, like the CFPB
report, used AAA data. 67 The data set for this report was also necessarily
small, consisting of 301 case files closed in an eight-month period in 2007.68
The SCJI report found a higher "win rate" for consumers than the CFPB
report, at 53.3% for affirmative consumer claims and an average recovery
of $19,255.69 Additionally, the SCJI made the following findings suggesting
that arbitration may be fair for consumers (or at least was for the 301 cases
studied in 2007):
*
*
*

Arbitrators awarded consumers attorney's fees "in 63.1% of cases in
which consumers sought such an award";
The upfront costs for consumer claimants "appears to be quite low;"
at an average of $96 for claims under $10,000; and
AAA consumer arbitration "seems to be an expeditious way to
70
resolve disputes."

63. Id.
64. As noted above, the CFPB's authority to impose conditions or limit pre-dispute arbitration in
consumer financial services is limited to those regulations or findings that are "consistent with" the
Congressionally-commissioned arbitration study. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b).
65. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14, § 5.3, at 15-16
Christopher K Drahozal
for a discussion of the limited prior research on consumer arbitration. See also
& Samantha Zyontz, An EmpiicalStudy ofAAA ConsumerArbitraions,25 OHIO ST.J. ON DISP. RESOL.
843, 845, 919-27 (2010) (identifying prior empirical studies and data sets on consumer arbitration,
summarizing the central findings and noting that "few studies have examined consumer arbitration in
any detail'); Rutledge, supra note 46, at 558 (discussing empirical research in the consumer and
employment context). Because this Essay focuses on consumer arbitration, studies of arbitration in
other contexts such as employment or securities are not included.
66. SEARLE CIVILJUST. INST., PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39. These findings are explored
in Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 65, at 908.
67. SEARLE CIVILJUST. INST., PRELIMINARY REPORT, supranote 39.
68. Id.
69. Id.The SCJI determined the business win rate was 83.6% of affirmative business claims with
an average recovery of $20,648. Id.

70. Id.
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In 2013, Professors Peter Rutledge and Christopher Drahozal published
their empirical findings regarding consumer-credit-card-arbitrationagreement terms. 7 This study was unusual because it was based on a
comprehensive data set of arbitration agreement terms in the credit card
setting. The "Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure
Act of 2009 (Credit CARD Act) requires all issuers to provide electronic
copies of their consumer credit card agreements to the Federal Reserve,"
which maintains them publicly on the Internet.7 2 This empirical study
focused on arbitration agreement terms, and did not assess data regarding
arbitration proceedings or outcomes. 7 3 The AAA published a short
snapshot of consumer arbitration for consumer cases from January through
August 2007, based on 310 consumer cases in which an award issued. 74 The
AAA reported a 60% settlement rate of its approximately 1,500 consumer
cases, and reported 48% and 74% consumer and business win rates,
respectively.7 5 Other studies focused on data from the now defunct
National Arbitration Forum (NAF), which handled many consumer credit
card debt collections. 7 6 In 2009, the Minnesota Attorney General filed suit
77
against the NAF-the then leading debt collection arbitration forum.
According to the allegations, the NAF purportedly held itself out as an
impartial arbitration provider while having ties to key members of the debt
collection industry. 78 Within days, the NAF entered into a settlement with
the Minnesota Attorney General that required it to cease arbitrating
71. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1 (2013).
72. Id. at 14-15 (describing and citing the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 5 204(a), 123 Stat. 1734, 1746-47 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., and 32 U.S.C.)).
73. Id. at 15. For another survey of arbitration prevalence and terms in social media, see Michael
L. Rustad et al., An EmpiricalStudy ofPredsputeMandatoyArbitration Clausesin SocialMediaTerms ofService
Agreements, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643, 653-54 (2012).
74. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Analysis of the American Arbitration Assodation's Consumer Arbitration
Caseload,https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004325 (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
75. Id.
76. See SEARLE CIVIL JUST. INST., PREIMLINARY REPORT, supra note 39, at 116 (analyzing the

NAF arbitrations involving consumer banking); see also JOHN O'DONNELL, ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN,
THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 1 (2007)
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf (summarizing a study on mandatory
arbitration in the credit card industry); Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on
ConsumerArbitration:What the DataReveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051,1051-52 (2009); Mark Fellows,
The Same Result As in Court,More Efficiently: ComparingArbitration and Court litigation Outcomes, METRO.
CORP. COUNS., July 2006, at 32, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/July/32.pdf
(analyzing the ability of arbitrators to come to the same conclusions consistently in different cases while
providing for a more efficient process).
77. Firm Agrees to End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, N.Y. TMES (July 19, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/business/20credit.httml.
78. Complaint, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550, 2009 WL 2029918,
at *1-2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2009) (on file with author).
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consumer debt collection cases. 7 9
Professors Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin compared use of arbitration
agreements in business-consumer and nonconsumer contracts in a select
subset of twenty-one large public corporations, but again, did not analyze
consumer arbitration outcomes.8 0
Additionally, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) issued a report of its findings on consumer debt
collection in litigation and arbitration in 2010."a Again, while useful, this
report is limited to consumer debt collection and is based on information
from a public workshop, roundtables, and public comment. It is not an
empirical consumer survey. The CFPB Arbitration Report, the SCJI
arbitration report, and their precursors provide an important snapshot of
information about consumer arbitration. But it is in a limited context. The
two most robust reports (from the CFPB and the SCJI) are limited to AAA
data.8 2 Although the AAA is most likely the largest consumer arbitration
provider, it is not the only provider. Thus, this data only captures a subset
of information regarding consumer arbitration.8 3 Data inaccessibility
inhibits concentrated studies about consumer arbitration prevalence and
outcomes. The number of consumer arbitrations resulting in an arbitral
award in each of these studies is low. The CFPB report was based on 1,847
filings (ofwhich 341 resulted in an award) and the SCJI report was based on
301 disputes.8 4 Additionally, the CFPB based its report solely on disputes
regarding consumer financial services (i.e., credit cards, payday loans,
student loans, banking accounts, mobile wireless services, prepaid cards, and
limited auto purchase loans).8" Thus, any assessments of the data in these
reports must be guarded with an appreciation of the limited data set and
79. Consent Judgment, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, No. 27-CV-09-18550, 2009
WL 5424036, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct.July 17, 2009).
80. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitraion
Clauses in Consumer andNonconsumer Contracts,41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 881-83 (2008) (examining
select consumer contracts in mobile wireless providers, credit card companies, cable providers, and

stock-trading services and finding 75% of the consumer contracts in the sample had arbitration
clauses).
81. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT

COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 62-63 (2010) http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/publlcevents/life-debt/debtcollectionreporrO.pdf (stating that reasoned opinions
in consumer debt collection cases are rare because they must be requested by a party and are often
accompanied by a fee).
82. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14, 5 5, at 3

(reviewing arbitrations conducted by the AAA from 2010 to 2012); SEARLE CIVIL JUST. INST.,
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39 (examining consumer arbitrations administered by AAA).
83. In 'Underdog"Arbitration:A Planfor Transpareng,supranote 14, at 1727, I argue that Congress
should impose data-reporting requirements on all providers handling consumer arbitrations to enhance
empiricl assessment of this dispute resolution forum.
84. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supranote 14, 5 5.2.1, at 9, § 5.2.2,

12; SEARLE CIVILJUST. INST., PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39.
85. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14, 5 5.4, at 17-18.
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awareness that consumer arbitration filings are not robust.
B. The CFPB Study Provides Some EncouragingDataRegarding Consumer
Experiences in Arbitration.
The CFPB Report must be read with an awareness of its importance, as
the most robust report of its time to date, and of its limitations-specifically
that it is limited to AAA data on consumer arbitration for consumer
financial products. Nevertheless, it gives us an exciting window into the
world of consumer arbitration and it tells us that maybe, just maybe,
something right is evolving in mandatory, pre-dispute, consumer arbitration.
First, most arbitrations settle or end consistent with settlement. Of the
1,060 consumer financial products or services agreements the CFPB studied
that had resolved by the data collection date (2013), 23% resulted in a known
settlement and 34% ended consistent with settlement. 8 6 Thus, nearly 60%
of consumer arbitration cases studied likely settled. Only 32% of these cases
resolved on the merits.8 7 This should indicate to us that something "right"
is happening in consumer arbitration. As discussed in Part I, above,
businesses have an incentive to settle consumer cases in arbitration either
due to incentivizing agreements or due to consumer filing fee limitations
which place the majority of the fees on the business. The implication that
most arbitrations result in a mutual resolution without resort to arbitral
decision tells us that arbitration dispute resolution is developing along the
lines of civil litigation practice, where we know most cases settle.
Second, Professor Sternlight and others criticize consumer arbitration
compared to the class action claiming that disputants will not be able to
obtain attorney representation absent the economic rewards of attorney's
But the CFPB study found that
fees available through class action."
counsel represented consumers in nearly 60% of consumer financial services
or product cases. 8 9 One would suspect that much of this consumer
representation stems from higher value claims (the median consumer claim
86. Id. § 5.6 at 32.
87. Id.
88. See Jean Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting
ProceduralyDfficult Claims,42 SW. L. REV. 87, 117-19 (2012) (arguing that attorneys are needed to assist
plaintiffs in procedurally difficult claims and are unlikely to be economically able to provide that
assistance absent the class device); see also J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement
Mechanisms in Publc Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1137, 1210 (2012) ("Moreover, it is inconceivable
that a private attorney, who might have sufficient expertise in consumer fraud, will have the economic
incentive to root out consumer fraud if the only economic gain to be had is through individual
arbitrations.'D.
89. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14, § 1.4.3, at 12
(noting that "[c]ompanies almost always had counsel".
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amount was $11,500 and the median disputed debt amount was
approximately $11,000).9 Although the data does not show a significant
variance in outcomes based on attorney representation or lack of

representation, the data set is very small, prohibiting broad conclusions.91
Nevertheless, the study does not support the conclusion that consumer
arbitration is a bar to obtaining representation.
Another concern raised by consumer arbitration critics is the potential
for arbitrator or arbitration-service provider bias in favor of the repeat
player. Some suggest that arbitrators may be consciously or unconsciously
influenced by the fact that the corporate litigant is the paying party, and will
not bring him or her repeat business if the arbitrator issues a decision or

award that is not favorable to the business. 92 This "don't bite the hand that
feeds you" prognosis has some basic logic to it, but does not necessarily
indicate that all arbitrators have repeat-player bias. There is evidence that
in employment arbitration, repeat players have tended to fare better than
one-shot players. 9 3 But there may be many factors contributing to these
90. Id
91. Id 5 5.6.11 at 55.
92. See Jean R. Sternlight, CreepingMandatory Arbitration:Is ItJust?,57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 164950 (2005).
There are virtually an infinite number of ways in which a company, as the drafting party, can try
to use an arbitration clause to gain the upper hand, including arbitrator selection, imposition of
high costs, and limitation of remedies. While it would be wrong to suggest that most of these
excesses are included in most arbitration clauses, some of them are quite common.
This argument has been discussed in the employment context. SeeJulius G. Getman, LaborArybitraion
and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 936 (1979) ("A system of private selection would be
disadvantageous to employees, since an arbitrator could improve his chances of future selection by
deciding favorably to institutional defendants."); see also Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,
1485 (D.C. Cit. 1997) ("If an arbitrator is likely to 'lean' in favor of an employer-something we have
no reason to suspect-it would be because the employer is a source of future arbitration business');
Lisa Blomgren Amsler, CombatingStructuralBiasin Dispute System DesignsThat UseArbitration:Tranparengy,
the UniversalSanitiZer, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 32,41 (2014) (concluding that adhesive arbitration
bears indicia of structural bias because the disputant with superior economic control takes unilateral
control over designing the dispute system for conflicts, and the arbitration agreements restrict recourse
to the public civil justice system by typically removing collective action options).
93. See Lisa B. Bingham, EmploymentArbiraion:The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 189, 213 (1997) (finding that in repeat player cases, "employees won something only 16% of the
time," compared with a 63% employee win rate overall, and that employees dealing with non-repeat
players "recovered on average 48% of what they demanded, while employees dealing with repeat player
employers recovered only 11% of what they demanded"); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players,Adhesive
Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judical Review of Employment ArbitrationAwards, 29 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 223, 239 (1998) ('The repeat player effect is a cause for concern because in dispute resolution,
sometimes the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. There is undeniably a repeat player
effect in employment arbitration.'). Empirical research has found an employee win rate of 32% against
one-shot employers compared to 13.9% against repeat player employers, and only 11.3% where the
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differential outcomes, such as the strength of the claims, the settlement rate,
94
and award ratio and most importantly, familiarity with the process.
Professor Elizabeth Hill coined this the "appellate effect" in her empirical
Professor Hill found that
study of 200 AAA employment cases. 95
employers who repeatedly arbitrate tend to win more frequently than oneshot players, but only two of the two hundred cases in her sample involved
96
The fact that
an arbitration concerning the same company and arbitrator.
means that
other
each
with
players
only 1% of the parties were truly repeat
arbitrator bias towards the repeat party should not have demonstrated an
effect. But Hill also found the win-loss record for those repeat employers
who maintained an in-house dispute resolution program culminating in
AAA arbitration to be much higher than those repeat employers without an
in-house program.9 7 Thus, according to Hill, the "effect appears to be the
result of the selection processes of large employers' in-house dispute
resolution programs, not merely the by-product of large employers' repeat
' 98
appearances at arbitration.
If the repeat-player effect is due to Hill's "appellate effect" or developing
sophistication and knowledge about the process, the CFPB report shows
that consumers can benefit from the effect as well-through using repeat
attorneys. 9 9 The CFPB study panel considered a consumer a "repeat
player" if represented by a law fin that represented other consumers 0in
0
disputes relating to the same subject matter, consumer financial services.'
For companies, the CFPB considered it a repeat player if the same company
had appeared in more than one related consumer financial product or
services dispute. 10 1 The study found that 45% of filings were by heavy

repeat-player employer was paired with a repeat arbitrator. Alexander J.S. Colvin, EmpiricalResearch on
EmplqymentArbitraion:Cianoy Amidst the Sound andFuy?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405,430 (2007).
There was also a finding of a 2% win rate when a repeat employer was paired with a repeat arbitrator
against a pro se claimant. Id. at 434.
94. See Drahozal & Zyontz, stpra note 65, at 862 (collecting empirical studies and observing that
"[overall, the empirical evidence tends to support the existence of a repeat-player effect, but suggests
that the effect may be due to case screening by repeat businesses rather than repeat-arbitrator or repeatplayer bias"); see also Bingham, supra note 93, at 241; Colvin, supra note 93, at 417-18 (analyzing
selection effects, costs, and availability of proceedings as variables that could affect outcomes of
arbitration).
95. Elizabeth Hill, AAA EmploymentArbitraion:A FairForum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J., 9, 15
(2003).

96. Id.
97. Id.

98. Id.
99. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14, 5 5.6.12, at 56-57.
100. Id. at 57-58.
101. Id. at 57.
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consumer repeat players, meaning the attorney appeared in four or more
disputes filed in 2010, 2011, or 2012.102 For student loan disputes, heavy
repeat player-law firms represented 93% of consumers.1 0 3 Cumulatively,
repeat player attorneys represented consumers in 50% of filings across all
product markets.10 4 Not surprisingly, heavy company repeat players
dominated arbitration filings for 2010-2011, constituting over 80% of
filings.1 0 ' While the high proportion of potential settlement outcomes
effectively precludes drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of
consumer repeat attorney representation in terms of "win rates;" the CFPB
study found that disputes with a repeat corporate player against an
unrepresented consumer was more likely to reach a merits decision than any
other type of party pairing.10 6 This information tells us that to the extent
consumers are participating in arbitration, many of them are obtaining
attorney representation by experienced law firms. Indeed, consumerarbitration repeat filings appear to be a developing niche for consumer
attorneys, even absent the class action.
Finally, the CFPB study tells us that dispute resolution is not a priority
for consumer choice. Consumer prioritization about dispute resolution
does not inform us as to its fairness, adequacy, or societal detriments, but it
is a piece of the equation that cannot be overlooked. How important is the
class action to the consumer? Apparently not much. The CFPB conducted
a telephone survey in which it asked over 1,000 respondents about the
factors that were important to them in selecting a credit card.'
When
asked an open-ended question, most respondents identified card rewards,
interest rates, fees and application convenience.1 0 8 Not surprisingly, no
respondent raised dispute resolution.10 9 When the telephone prompter
described a hypothetical to the consumer in which a credit card company
charged an improper fee and asked what he or she would do, most
respondents commonsensically answered that he would cancel the card
(57.2%).11 ° Less than 2% mentioned seeking legal advice or suing with an
attorney, but 10% stated they would refer the issue to a governmental

102. Id. at 58-59.
103. Id at 60.
104. Id. at 60 fig. 15.
105. Id. at 59 fig. 14.
106. Id. at 65-66.
107. Id. 3.4 at 10-11.
108. Id. 3.4.1 at 15.
109. Id.
110. Id. § 3.4.2 at 16, 18.
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agency. 11
C. The CFPB Study ProvidesNo Basisfor the Conclusion that ConsumersAre
Better Off Through Preservation of the Class Action.
The above data suggest that this burgeoning arena of consumer
arbitration, which has undergone significant developments and protections
over the last two decades, has some promising developments for the
consumer. But the CFPB study does not support the CFPB's conclusion
that the class action must be preserved to protect the consumer. Instead,
the study presents some disturbing data about the usefulness of the class
good.1 1 2
action to the individual class member and as a societal
Approximately 6 0% of the consumer financial products class actions filed
ended in a non-class settlement or potentialnon-class settlement (i.e., withdrawal or
dismissal by the plaintiff).' 1 3 Approximately 12% (69 cases) reached an
approved class-action settlement." 4 This means that only a very small
portion of class actions filed result in any damages to the class-member
consumer. Yet those class actions filed do result in a societal drain on
judicial resources, and corporate class action defense costs (which we would
assume are passed on in one form or other to the consumer). Attorneys'
fees awarded to counsel in class action settlements during the relevant time
frame were $424 million, which is estimated at about 24% of total class
payments and 16% of gross relief (proposed cash relief and in kind
relief). 115
Second, looking at a broader data set of consumer financial class-action
settlements from 2008 to 2012, the average claims rate (claims made as11 a6
median.
percentage of eligible class members) was low, 210%, with an 8%

111. Id. at 18.
112. The CFPB Arbitration Study analyzed 562 consumer financial products putative class cases
filed between 2010-2012 and identified an outcome for 478 of those cases by the study date. Id. § 6 at
36. Of those, none went to trial on the merits. Id § 6 at 7. Ten were resolved against the company on
3
motion, but only three (0.6 %) of those were on a class-wide basis. Id. Additionally, of those ten
resolved on the merits, seven were through default judgment. Id. § 6 at 37-38. It is also worth noting
that in 94 of the 562 class actions studied, companies moved to compel arbitration; 46 of such motions
were granted in full or in part. Id. § 6 at 8-9.
113. Id § 6 at40 fig. 11.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 8 at 33.
116. Id. § 8 at 5. Assessing claims rate is difficult and has some limitations as acknowledged in
the CFPB Study. Id. § 8 at 30 n.49. Thus, the CFPB advises that these numbers should be viewed as
a floor, because it may underestimate the actual rate. But the data reflects that consumers fail to capture
much of the settlement relief offered. See id (explaining how some litigants, even after obtaining a final
order, do not file a settlement administrator report).
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Thus, even when consumers obtain a settlement through the class device,
they usually do not take the administrative steps to obtain the payout.
Finally, the CFPB study did not attempt to provide data on the average
class member recovery for those sixty-nine cases that reached class
settlement or the difficulty of obtaining settlement proceeds. One might
assume, based on experience, that individual recovery is de minimis and
oftentimes worthless, in the form of a coupon or as the Jimmy John's case
above shows, a pickle. But even taking Director Cordray's slogan of an
average of "about $220 million in payments to 6.8 million consumers per
year in consumer financial services cases[J"' 7 one could estimate this
results in about $32.35 in recovery to the individual per year, that is, if he or
she takes the time to read and fill out the cumbersome forms required for
claims-made recovery. If critics make the argument that most consumers
will not take the time to read consumer arbitration rules or file a simple
demand, the same argument cuts against class action recovery, which often
comes on a multi-page court document notifying the class member of the
proposed settlement and the effect of settlement (binding her claims if she
does not opt out). This provides the class member with an unrealistic
opportunity to object to the settlement in court and provides for more
paperwork to claim some amount of reward. The CFPB is to be
commended for including this class-action comparative data in its
arbitration study, but the data does not support the conclusion that class
actions are necessary to protect the individual consumer. Instead, the data
suggests that some consumers may have a higher likelihood for a near-full
recovery through individual arbitration. The CFPB's decision to exclude
governmental financial entities, on the other hand, suggests that for
consumers of government financial products, individual arbitration can be
an appropriate alternative forum to the class action.1 18 The only
explanation the CFPB offers for the government exclusion is its belief that
federal and state governments and their affiliates are "uniquely accountable
through the democratic process to consumers."'' 9
D. Seeking Guidancefrom OtherDipute Resolution Systems: The European
Union'sMove in Favorof ConsumerADR
One other reason we should be skeptical of the CFPB's proposed rule,
which will effectively kill arbitration for consumer financial services

117. Cordray, Prepared Remarks, supra note 1.
118. Arbitration Agreements, supra note 2, at 32,925.
119. Id. at 32,881.
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disputes, is that it is a step in the wrong direction when compared with the
1 20 In
direction other countries are taking for consumer dispute resolution.
2013, the European Union (EU) issued the Directive on Alternative Dispute
Resolution for Consumer Disputes, which took effect July 2015.121 The
Regulation on Online Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes took
effect January 2016.122 The rules require EU member states to ensure
customer complaints "can be resolved online by nationally certified
''
alternative dispute resolution entities. 123 The Directive does not make
participation in alternative dispute resolution compulsory for merchants or
consumers, but it does require all EU national governments to ensure the
availability of an alternative dispute resolution entity for consumer claims
12 4
The procedural
that meets the procedural standards of the Directive.
requirements include an online dispute resolution process that is free or lowcost, impartial, transparent, fair, and legal (meaning that the dispute
12 5
Additionally, the Directive
resolution provider will follow the law).
resolution after the
dispute
agree to alternative
requires that consumers
126
dispute arises.
Right away, some differences between EU consumer alternative dispute
resolution and binding pre-dispute consumer arbitration in the United States
emerge. But the Directive and implementing Regulation show the EU's
movement towards low-cost and accessible dispute resolution for
consumers. The Directive states as its purpose:
Ensuring access to simple, efficient, fast and low-cost ways of resolving
domestic and cross-border disputes which arise from sales or service contracts

120. See Pablo Cortts, The Brave New World of Consumer Redress in the European Union andthe United
Kngdom, Disp. Resol. Mag., Spring 2016, at 41 (describing recent movements towards consumer ADR
in Europe); Horst Eidenmfiller & Martin Engel, Against FalseSettlement: DesigningEfficient ConsumerRights
Enforcement Systems in Europe, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 261,275-77 (2014) (comparing consumer
dispute resolution in the European Union, the United States, and Australia); Scott J. Shackelford &
Anjanette H. Raymond, Building the Virtual Courthouse: Ethical Considerationsfor Design, Implementation, and
Regulation in the World of ODR, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 615, 631 (2014) (discussing the growing trend towards
reliance on online dispute resolution programs and noting that the CFPB Arbitration report shows that
"f]ustice is being denied to too many individuals when the amount in dispute is relatively low").
121. Council Directive 2013/11, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 63, 79 (EU), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2013:165:FULL&from=EN.
122. Council Regulation 524/2013, art. 22, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 1, m11= (EU), http://eur201
EN.
3:165:FULL&fro
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/uri=OJ:L:
at
41.
123. Corths, supra note 120,
124. Council Directive 2013/11, para. 7, 20130.J. (L165) 63, 64 (EU), http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2013:165:FULL&from=EN.
125. Id. para. 10, 2013 O.J. at 63, 64; see also Cortts, supra note 120, at 41.
126. Cortes, supra note 120, at 41.
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should benefit consumers and therefore boost their confidence in the market.
That access should apply to online as well as to offline transactions, and is
27
particularly important when consumers shop across borders. 1
The Regulation, in turn, requires the European Commission to run an online
dispute resolution platform which will channel e-commerce complaints to
the certified alternative dispute resolution entities. 2 8 My own prediction is
that the next decade will see a marked increase in these online dispute
resolution services that permit easy and efficient dispute resolution. 12 9
Many justice systems are struggling with the same issue present in the
United States. How do we provide meaningful redress for low-value claims
given the increasing costs of public courts? In a new report to the Judiciary,
Lord Justice Briggs recommended that the United Kingdom establish an
online court system to provide access to justice for "ordinary individuals
and small businesses."' 30 In a way, the EU Directive and Regulations show
us a model that we could work towards: efficient, simple, and low-cost
dispute resolution with procedural safeguards for fairness, transparency,
3
independence, and legality.1 1
V. WHAT TO Do WITH THE CFPB DATA FOR CONSUMER ARBITRATION
GENERALLY?

Part of our panel's job was to address the issue of how the CFPB's study
and proposed rule will affect consumer contracts generally. It is important
to appreciate the CFPB study for what it is: a big step in the right direction

127. Council Directive 2013/11, para. 10, 20130.J. (1165) 63, 64 (EU), http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2013:165:FULL&from =EN.
128. Council Regulation 524/2013, art. 2, 20130J. (L165) 1, 5 (EU), http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?ui=OJ:L:2013:165:FULLJ&from=EN.
In his article,
The Brave New World of Consumer Redress in the European Union and the United Ki'ngdom, Professor Pablo
Cortds recounts several experiences in which he quickly and efficiently achieved consumer redress
under the new EU alternative dispute resolution rules. Cortes, supra note 120, at 43.
129. For a discussion of emerging trends in online dispute resolution, see Shackelford &
Raymond, supra note 120, at 627, which discusses recent trends in online dispute resolution
development, including a private online dispute resolution provider, Modria, which New Orleans
Parish has implemented for property tax assessment appeals). See also About Us, MODRIA
http://modria.com/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2017). A quick google search will show that
Modria's popularity has caught on like wildfire.
130. L. J. Briggs, JUDICIARY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, CIVIL COURT STRUCTURE REVIEW:

FINAL REPORT, July 2016 at 28, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/civilcourts-structure-review-final-report-jul-16-final-l.pdf. See also Cortbs, supranote 120, at 44.
131. See e.g. Resnick, supra note 14, at 2930-32 (discussing attributes of EU's move to consumer
alternative dispute resolution/online dispute resolution and highlighting the favorable attributes of that
system).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol48/iss2/7

26

Lampley: The CFPB Anti-Arbitration Proposal

20161

LET'S JUST GIvE ARBITRATIONA CHANCE

of arbitration transparency. One critical piece of information produced by
the study is that consumers file only about 411 affirmative consumer
1 32
While this
financial products or services arbitration disputes annually.
1 3 3 it is still
area,
this
in
filings
constitutes nearly 70% of all consumer
abysmally low. That means that any empirical study, even of AAA
arbitrations, is going to have a limited data set. The question raised is why
do consumers file so few claims? Is it due to fear of arbitration?
Unfamiliarity? If so, law schools, legal aid clinics, and the CFPB itself can
do much to educate the public about the potential benefits of arbitration
and how to do it. The response may be that consumers just do not care
enough to pursue these claims. But without significant efforts to educate
and represent consumers by consumer support groups, it is too soon to
fairly assess consumer arbitration, particularly given what we know about
the class action. However, other implications of the study are useful in
application to consumer arbitration outside the financial products arena.
the time.1 3 4
Consumers are getting attorney representation about 50% of
Those attorneys tend to have some level of repeat-player knowledge with
3 6 This signals that the
arbitration.' 3 5 And consumer cases tend to settle.'
consumer is getting some relief. Still, we need more information from all
providers, not just the AAA, and we need regulation. For the consumer
arbitration model to work, even theoretically, businesses have to be willing
to trade the class device for free and fair arbitration that is transparent.
Thus, federal agencies like the CFPB could engage in regulatory work by (1)
requiring that business pay 100% of arbitration costs; (2) providing an
incentivizing clause resulting in a windfall to the consumer (and consumer
attorney) if the company fails to settle and the consumer wins a great
amount; (3) prohibiting confidentiality clauses so that consumer attorneys
can work together to pursue discovery or expert witnesses, even if they
cannot assert joint claims; (4) requiring greater transparency through
detailed data reporting by the arbitration provider and business on claims
and outcomes; (5) broadening the scope of appellate review; and (6)
requiring a written statement of decision to assess arbitrator expertise and
engagement of the law. The CFPB paradoxically elected to do none of these
things, instead choosing to effectively "kill" consumer arbitration by
elevating the usefulness of class action above the results shown by its own
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14,

1.4.3, at 11.

Id.
Id. 5 5.2.1 at 10.
Id. § 1.4.3 at 12.
Id § 6.6.2 at 48.
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study. But there is no reason the FTC or Congress should follow this course
with other consumer products or services, unless we have more data proving
13 7
that consumers simply will not bring arbitration claims.
Perhaps the most important struggle with permitting mandatory predispute consumer arbitration to continue evolving is Professor Sternlight's
argument that consumers simply will not bring claims. Some claims are
either too difficult to discover, or too difficult to prove without a team of
attorneys or protracted discovery.138 This is undoubtedly true for some
claims, although it would be difficult to estimate how much. It is also
undoubtedly true that many class claims are not worth the societal costs
(evidenced by the 60% failure rate among those that do not result in class
settlement). One solution is to rely on public enforcement. The CFPB has
breathed new life into the tools of the federal agency avenger, negotiating
numerous settlements or fines with consumer financial services
companies.1 3 9 The FTC could equally rise to the consumer protection task,
as can state attorneys general. Indeed, those government officials tasked
with consumer protection are likely in a better place to prioritize overall
consumer injustices than plaintiffs' class action attorneys. Peter Linzer, the
moderator, concluded our discussion with the observation that the CFPB
study does not show that class actions are a good solution, but it might be
the best solution we have compared to consumer arbitration. Respectfully,
I disagree. With consumer education and a willingness of a new wave of
attorneys to engage in repeat consumer arbitration filing, consumer
arbitration has the potential to prove a fruitful new arena for free and

137. In October 2016, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) drastically changed
its proposed rule governing nursing home pre-dispute arbitration agreements by precluding pre-dispute
arbitration agreements with prospective residents. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of
Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,688, 68,690 (Oct. 4, 2016) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 483). This final rule is a stark departure from the proposed rule, which would have
permitted pre-dispute nursing home arbitration agreements with certain contractual and procedural
safeguards. Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42264 (proposed
July 16, 2015). The American Health Care Association and other plaintiffs have already filed a lawsuit
contesting CMS's authority to promulgate the pre-dispute arbitration ban and claiming that it violates
the FAA. Complaint, Am. Family Health Care Assoc. v. Burwell, Civ. Act. No. 3:2016cv00233,
(N.D. Miss. Oct. 17, 2016).
138. Sternlight, supra note 88, at 114.
139. One need look no further than the $185 million fine, including $100 million penalty, the
CFPB assessed against Wells Fargo for fraudulently opening consumer accounts. See Michael Corkery,
Wells Fargo Fined $185 Milhon for FraudulentA Opening Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept 8, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-tocustomers.html?_r=0. The fall-out from this penalty and scandal ultimately caused the CEO to resign.
Emily Glazer, Wells Fago CEO John Stutpf Steps Down, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-ceo-stumpf-to-retire- 1476306019.
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individual consumer recovery, run much like a private administrative law
court. But the process is still early, and there are many regulatory measures
appropriately called for that stop short of banning arbitration outright.
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